Something that we discussed for the majority of class on Tuesday was the nature of creation, goodness, and free will within the world of The Lord of the Rings and its broader mythological foundation in The Silmarillion. The cosmogony that Tolkien presents dramatizes the tension between divine intention and free will. Melkor/Morgoth, introduced discord into the world, and disagreed with the supreme creator Eru Ilúvater. It seems however, almost as if Melkor/Morgoth could not help it as Tolkien writes that the Valar “comprehended only that part of the mind of Ilúvatar from which he came” (Ainulindalë). In a way it almost seems as if the fall was inevitable. This begs the question, if Eru Ilúvater did not want treachery and covetousness into the world, why did he create Melkor/Morgoth the way that he did? In addition Melkor/Morgoth, are not the only Valar that are capable of being disobedient/rebellious, as demonstrated in the incident where Aulë created the dwarves in an overstep of his authority.
In Tolkien’s cosmogony, evil is not a rival power that is equal to good. It arises instead as a corruption of an ultimately good creation which is a very Christian idea, echoing both the fall of Lucifer (the rebellion of a favored son/angel), and the garden of Eden (in which a perfect creation is ultimately corrupted). Tolkien does not just replicate Christian doctrine in his literary works, however. I would argue that while Tolkien may have taken inspiration from a variety of sources, including potentially Paradise Lost which we discussed in class, there is no one to one parallel between a single cosmogony and Tolkien’s metaphysics.
An example of an interesting case is the Valar. What are they, and do they have free will? Some in class proposed that they were akin to the Greek gods, and some said the saints, still others proposed angels. Each of these comparisons captures something true, but none are perfectly correct. The Valar are not objects of worship, which distinguishes them from deities in polytheistic systems, but they appear to each have control over a different aspect of the world, for example Ulmo with water, and Yavanna with the Earth in they way that deities do in polytheistic systems. The Valar, unlike polytheistic deities, are also subject to a singular higher authority that is the ultimate creator. The comparison to saints is also limited as saints are human elevated by holiness, but the Valar are primordial beings who existed before the physical world. Saints may have some degree of closeness to God, but not in the same way the Valar do to Eru Ilúvater. The Valar almost seem to be extensions of Ilúvatar’s will, as shown in the quote referenced earlier from Ainulindalë ((so are they closer to the Christian Trinity in that way?) (But that wouldn’t make sense because then the creator would have an aspect of evil within him?)).
Tolkien himself refers to them as angels on occasion in Letter 153, but that also does not seem quite right (193-194). The Valar have a degree of creative participation in the world that goes beyond traditional roles of angels within Christianity as messengers, servants, and occasionally warriors, but they “cannot by their own will alter any fundamental provision” (what counts as a fundamental provision?) (194). This question of what counts as a fundamental provision implies that the Valar can only do things that agree with the will of Eru Ilúvater, but then that would mean that the fall of Morgoth/Melkor and the creation of dwarves by Aulë was in fact a part of Eru Ilúvater’s plan. Tolkien also refers to a ”Divine Plan for the enablement of the Human Race” which further complicates this picture (194). Characters appear to have destinies, and there are prophecies which implies at least some degree of predestination, while still including a dynamic development of events in which choice is a key aspect. According, once again to Letter 153 (there’s a lot of good stuff in there) “it is the Pity of Bilbo and later Frodo that ultimately allows the quest to be achieved” (191). Taking that into consideration, while combined with Tolkien’s later metaphysical creation, the fate of the world does not depend on these larger forces, instead what matters are small choices towards mercy. It is the decision on multiple occasions to spare Gollum, for instance, that ultimately leads to the destruction of the One Ring.
While writing this post I kept thinking back to Tolkien’s own almost ambivalence as to whether or not to delve deeper into his work on a metaphysical level. He tells Peter Hastings, when pressed about his theological underpinnings, that Hastings might be taking things too seriously. The internal consistency and depth of his world however, really does invite rigorous analysis. Tolkien himself may caution against over-systematizing what is, a work of imaginative sub-creative fiction, and itself an action of free will, but it is still deeply interesting to do so. This tension may in fact actually mirror the themes that Tolkien explores. Just as the Valar cannot fully comprehend Iluvatar’s mind, readers will never be able to fully decode Tolkien’s work completely, according to how he may have wanted, no matter how much one reads of his letters/work. As shown by the extensive parenthetical questioning within this blog post, there are no answers, only further questions, and more room to play within Tolkien’s world.
Citations
Tolkien, J.R.R. The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien. Houghton Mifflin,1981.
Thursday, April 23, 2026
Free Will, the Valar, and Tolkien’s Cosmogony
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